Abstract. The problem of information flow in multithreaded programs remains an important open challenge. Existing approaches to specifying and enforcing information-flow security often suffer from over-restrictiveness, relying on nonstandard semantics, lack of compositionality, inability to handle dynamic threads, inability to handle synchronization, scheduler dependence, and efficiency overhead for the code that results from security-enforcing transformations. This paper suggests a remedy for some of these shortcomings by developing a novel treatment of the interaction between threads and the scheduler. As a result, we present a permissive noninterference-like security specification and a compositional security type system that provably enforces this specification. The type system guarantees security for a wide class of schedulers and provides a flexible and efficiency-friendly treatment of dynamic threads.
Introduction
The problem of information flow in multithreaded programs remains an important open challenge [SM03] . While information flow in sequential programs is relatively well understood, information-flow security specifications and enforcement mechanisms for sequential programs do not generalize naturally to multithreaded programs [SV98] . In this light, it is hardly surprising that Jif [MZZ + 06] and Flow Caml [Sim03], the mainstream compilers that enforce secure information flow, lack support for multithreading.
Nevertheless, the need for information flow control in multithreaded programs is pressing because concurrency and multithreading are ubiquitous in modern programming languages. Furthermore, multithreading is essential in security-critical systems because threads provide an effective mechanism for realizing the separation-of-duties principle [VM01] .
There is a series of properties that are desired of an approach to information flow for multithreaded programs:
-Permissiveness The presence of multithreading enables new attacks which are not possible for sequential programs. The challenge is to reject these attacks without compromising the permissiveness of the model. In other words, information flow models should accept as many intuitively secure and useful programs as possible. -Scheduler-independence The security of a given program should not critically depend on a particular scheduler [SS00]. Scheduler-dependent security models suffer from the weakness that security guarantees may be destroyed by a slight change in the scheduler policy. Therefore, we aim at a security condition that is robust with respect to a wide class of schedulers. -Realistic semantics Following the philosophy of extensional security [McL90] , we argue for security defined in terms of standard semantics, as opposed to securityinstrumented semantics. If there are some nonstandard primitives that accommodate security, they should be clearly and securely implementable. -Language expressiveness A key to a practical security model is an expressive underlying language. In particular, the language should be able to treat dynamic thread creation, as well as provide possibilities for synchronization. -Practical enforcement Another practical key is a tractable security enforcement mechanism. Particularly attractive is compile-time automatic compositional analysis. Such an analysis should nevertheless be permissive, striving to trade as little expressiveness and efficiency for security as possible.
This paper develops an approach that is compatible with each of these properties by a novel treatment of the interaction between threads and the scheduler. We enrich the language with primitives for raising and lowering the security levels of threads. Threads with different security levels are treated differently by the scheduler, ensuring that the interleaving of publicly-observable events may not depend on sensitive data. As a result, we present a permissive noninterference-like security specification and a compositional security type system that provably enforces this specification. The type system guarantees security for a wide class of schedulers and provides a flexible and efficiency-friendly treatment of dynamic threads.
The main novelty of this paper, compared to a previous workshop version [RS06a] , is the inclusion of synchronization primitives into the underlying language.
In the rest of the paper we present background and related work (Section 2), the underlying language (Section 3), the security specification (Section 4), and the type-based analysis (Section 5). We discuss an extension to cooperative schedulers (Section 6), an example (Section 7), implementation issues (Section 8), and present an extension of the framework with synchronization primitives (Section 9), before we conclude the paper (Section 10).
Motivation and background
This section motivates and exemplifies some key issues with tracking information flow in multithreaded programs and presents an overview of existing work on addressing these issues.
Leaks via scheduler
Assume a partition of variables into high (secret) and low (public). Suppose h and l are a high and a low variable, respectively. Intuitively, information flow in a program is secure (or satisfies noninterference [Coh78, GM82, VSI96] ) if public outcomes of the program do not depend on high inputs. Typical leaks in sequential programs arise from explicit flows (as in assignment l := h) and implicit [DD77] flows via control flow (as in conditional if h > 0 then l := 1 else l := 0).
The ability of sequential threads to share memory opens up new information channels. Consider the following thread commands: c 1 : h := 0; l := h c 2 : h := secret where secret is a high variable. Thread c 1 is secure because the final value of l is always 0. Thread c 2 is secure because h and secret are at the same security level. Nevertheless, the parallel composition c 1 c 2 of the two threads is not necessarily secure. The scheduler might schedule c 2 after assignment h := 0 and before l := h is executed in c 1 . As a result, secret is copied into l.
Consider another pair of thread commands: These threads are clearly secure in isolation because 1 is always the outcome for l in d 1 , and 0 is always the outcome for l in d 2 . However, when d 1 and d 2 are executed in parallel, the security of the threadpool is no longer guaranteed. In fact, the program will leak whether the initial value of h was positive into l under many reasonable schedulers.
We observe that program c 1 c 2 can be straightforwardly secured by synchronization. Assuming the underlying language features locks, we can rewrite the program as c 1 : lock; h := 0; l := h; unlock c 2 : lock; h := secret; unlock
The lock primitives ensure that the undesired interleaving of c 1 and c 2 is prevented. Note that this solution prevents a race condition [SBN + 97] in the sense that it is now impossible for the two threads (where one of them attempts writing) to simultaneously access variable h.
Unfortunately, synchronization primitives, which are typically used for race-condition prevention (e.g., [CF07] ), offer no general solution. The source of the leak in program d 1 d 2 is internal timing [VS99] . The essence of the problem is that the timing behavior of a thread may affect-via the scheduler-the interleaving of assignments. As we will see later in this section, securing interleavings from within the program (such as with synchronization primitives) is a highly delicate matter.
What is the key reason for these flows? Observe that in both cases, it is the interleaving of the threads that introduces leaks. Hence, it is the scheduler and its interaction with the threads that needs to be secured in order to prevent undesired information disclosure. In this paper, we suggest a treatment of schedulers that allows the programmer to ensure from within the program that undesired interleavings are prevented.
In the rest of this section, we review existing approaches to information flow in multithreaded programs that are directly related to the paper. We refer to an overview of language-based information security [SM03] for other, less related, work.
Possibilistic security
Smith and Volpano [SV98] explore possibilistic noninterference for a language with static threads and a purely nondeterministic scheduler. Possibilistic noninterference states that possible low outputs of a program may not vary as high inputs are varied.
d 2 being placed as the first thread in the wait list for the lock. The scheduler will then schedule d 1 again, and d 1 will release the lock with unlock and try to grab the lock with lock. However, it will fail because d 2 is the first in the wait list. As a result, d 1 will be put behind d 2 in the wait list. Further, d 2 will be scheduled to set l to 0, release the lock, and finish. Finally, d 1 is able to grab the lock and execute l := 1, release the lock, and finish. The final value of l is 1. If, on the other hand, h ≤ 0 then, clearly, d 1 will finish within 70 steps, and the control will be then given to d 2 , which will grab the lock, execute l := 0, release the lock, and finish. The final value of l in this case is 0, which demonstrates that the program is insecure. Generally, under many schedulers, chances for l := 0 in d 2 to execute before l := 1 in d 1 are higher if the initial value of h is positive. Thus, the above implementation fails to remove the internal timing leak.
This example illustrates the need for a tighter interaction with the scheduler. The scheduler needs to be able to suspended certain threads instantly. This flexibility motivates the introduction of the hide and unhide constructs in this paper.
Returning to probabilistic scheduler-specific noninterference, Smith has continued this line of work [Smi01] to emphasize practical enforcement. In contrast to previous work, the security type system accepts while loops with high guards when no assignments to low variables follow such loops. Independently, Boudol and Castellani [BC01, BC02] provide a type system of similar power and show possibilistic noninterference for typable programs. This system does not rely on protect-like primitives but winds up rejecting assignments to low variables that follow conditionals with high guards.
The approaches above do not handle dynamic threads. Smith [Smi03] has suggested that the language can be extended with dynamic thread creation. The extension is discussed informally, with no definition for the semantics of fork, the thread creation construct. A compositional typing rule for fork is given, which allows spawning threads under conditionals with high guards. However, the uniform scheduler assumption is critical for such a treatment (as it is also for the treatment of while loops). Consider the following example: e 1 : l := 0 e 2 : l := 1 e 3 : if h > 0 then fork(skip, skip) else skip
This program is considered secure according to [Smi03] . Suppose the scheduler happens to first execute e 3 and then schedule the first thread (e 1 ) if the threadpool has more than three threads and the second thread (e 2 ) otherwise. This results in an information leak from h to l because the size of the threadpool depends on h. Note that the above program is insecure for many other schedulers. A minor deviation from the strictly uniform probabilistic choice of threads may result in leaking information. A possible alternative aimed at scheduler-independence is to force threads (created in branches of ifs with high guards) along with their children to be protected, i.e., to disable all other threads until all these threads have terminated (this can be implemented by, for example, thread priorities). Clearly, this would take a high efficiency tall on the encouraged programming practice of placing dedicated potentially time-consuming computation in separate threads. For example, creating a new thread for establishing a network connection is a much recommended pattern [Knu02, Mah04] .
The above discussion is another motivation for a tighter interaction between threads and the scheduler. A flexible scheduler would accommodate thread creation in a sen-sitive context by scheduling such threads independently from threads with attackerobservable assignments. This motivates the introduction of the hfork construct in this paper.
Scheduler-independent security
Sabelfeld and Sands [SS00] introduce a scheduler-independent security condition (with respect to possibly probabilistic schedulers) and suggest a type-based analysis that enforces this condition. The condition is, however, concerned with external timing leaks, which implies that the attacker is powerful enough to observe the actual execution time. External timing models rely on the underlying operating system and hardware to preserve the timing properties of a given program. Furthermore, the known padding techniques (e.g., [Aga00, SS00, KM07]) might arbitrarily change the efficiency of the resulting code.
In the present work, we assume a weaker attacker and aim for a more permissive security condition and analysis. Similarly to much related work (e.g., [VS99, Smi03, ZM03, HWS06, RS06b, RHNS07, BRRS07]) our attacker model does not permit observations of the execution time. The attacker may observe public outcomes of a program however, which is sufficient to launch attacks via internal timing. These attacks are dangerous because they can be magnified to leak all secrets in a single run (see, e.g., [RHNS07] ).
Security via low determinism
Inspired by Roscoe's low-view determinism [Ros95] for security in a CSP setting, Zdancewic and Myers [ZM03] develop an approach to information flow in concurrent systems. According to this approach, a program is secure if its publicly-observably results are deterministic and unchanged regardless of secret inputs. This avoids refinement attacks from the outset. However, low-view determinism security rejects intuitively secure programs (such as l := 0 l := 1), introducing the risk of rejecting useful programs. Analysis enforcing low-view determinism are inherently noncompositional because the parallel composition with a thread assigning to low variables is not generally secure.
Recently, Huisman et al. [HWS06] have suggested a temporal logic-based characterization of low-view determinism security. This characterization enables high-precision security enforcement by known model-checking techniques.
Security in the presence of synchronization
Andrews and Reitman [AR80] propose a logic for reasoning about information flow in a language with semaphores. However, the logic comes with no soundness arguments or decision algorithms.
External timing-sensitive security has been extended to languages with semaphores primitives by Sabelfeld [Sab01] and message passing by Sabelfeld and Mantel [SM02] . Although our focus is internal timing, the semantic presentation of semaphores from the former work serves as a useful starting point for this paper. 
Fig. 2. Semantics for commands
Recently, Russo et al. [RHNS07] have proposed a transformation that closes internal timing leaks by spawning sensitive computation in dedicated threads. Semaphores play a crucial role for the synchronization of these threads. However, contrary to this work, the source language for the transformation lacks semaphores.
Language
In order to illustrate our approach, we define a simple multithreaded language with dynamic thread creation. The syntax of language commands is displayed in Figure 1 . Besides the standard imperative primitives, the language features hiding (hide and unhide primitives) and dynamic thread creation (fork and hfork primitives).
Semantics for commands
A command c and a memory m together form a command configuration |c, m| . The semantics of configurations are presented in Figure 2 . A small semantic step has the form |c, m| α |c , m | that updates the command and memory in the presence of a possible event α. Events range over the set • , •, • d , • d , where d is a set of threads. The sequential composition rule propagates events to the top level. We describe the meaning of the events in conjunction with the rules that involve the events.
Two kinds of threads are supported by the semantics, low and high threads, partitioning the threadpool into low and high parts. The intention is to hide-via the scheduler-the (timing of the) execution of the high threads from the low threads.
The hiding command hide moves the current thread from the low to the high part of the threadpool. This is expressed in the semantics by event • that communicates to the scheduler to treat the thread as high (whether or not the thread was already high). The unhiding command unhide has the dual effect: it communicates to the scheduler by event • that the thread should be treated as low. To intuitively illustrate how to utilize hide and unhide, we modify the motivating example given in Section 2.1, where we wrap the branching command around hide and unhide commands as follows:
Initially, both threads, d 1 and d 2 are treated as low by the scheduler. After executing hide, d 1 is temporarily considered as a high thread and d 2 is not scheduled for executing until running the command unhide. As a consequence, the timing differences introduced by the branching instruction in d 1 are not visible to d 2 and internal-timing leaks are thus avoided.
Although hide and unhide commands are nonstandard, we will show that, unlike protect, they can be straightforwardly implemented.
We define independent commands hide and unhide instead of forcing them to wrap code blocks syntactically (cf. protect). We expect this choice to be useful when adding exceptions to the language. For example, consider the following program try { if l 1 then l 2 := 1; hide; c 1 else l 2 := 0; hide; c 2 } catch {unhide; c 3 } where command try determines code blocks that might throw an exception and command catch states exception handlers. Variables l 1 ,l 2 , and l 3 are public. Commands c 1 and c 2 contain branches whose guards involve secrets. Command c 3 is part of the exception handler. In this program, the unhide command in the exception handler refers to several hide primitives under the try statement.
Commands fork(c, d) and hfork(c, d) dynamically spawn a collection d of threads (commands) d = d 1 . . . d n while the current thread runs command c. The difference between the two primitives is in the generated event. Command fork signals about the creation of low threads with event • d (where • is read "low") while hfork indicates that new threads should be treated as high by event • d (where • is read "high"). Figure 3 depicts the semantic rules that describe the behavior of the scheduler. A scheduler is a program σ (written in a language, not necessarily related to one from Figure 1 ) that, together with a memory ν, forms a scheduler configuration |σ, ν| . We assume that the scheduler memory is disjoint from the program memory. The scheduler memory contains variable q that regulates for how many steps a thread can be scheduled. Live (i.e., ready to execute) threads are tracked by variable t that consists of low and high parts. The low part is named by t • , while the high part is composed of two subpools named t • and t e . Threads in t • are always high, but threads in t e were low in the past, are high at present, and might eventually be low in the future. Threads are moved back and forth from t • to t e by executing the hiding and unhiding commands. Variable r represents the running thread. Variable s regulates whether low threads may be scheduled. When s is •, both low and high threads may be scheduled. However, when s is •, only high threads may be scheduled, preventing low threads from observing internal timing information about high threads. In addition, the scheduler might have some internal variables.
Semantics for schedulers
Whenever a scheduler-operation rule handles an event, it either corresponds to processing information from the top level (such as threads creation and termination) or to communicating information to the top level (such as thread selection). The rules allow to derive steps of the form |σ, ν| α |σ , ν | . By convention, we refer to the variables in ν as q, t, r and s and variables in ν as q , t , r and s . When these variables are not explicitly mentioned, we adopt the convention that they remain unchanged after the transition. We assume that besides event-driven transitions, the scheduler might perform internal operations that are not visible at the top level (and may not change the variables above). We abstract away from these transitions, assuming that their event labels are empty. Although the transition system in Figure 3 is nondeterministic, we only consider deterministic instances of schedulers for simplicity. We expect a natural generalization of our results to probabilistic schedulers.
The rules can be viewed as a set of basic assumptions that we expect the scheduler to satisfy. We abstract away from the actual scheduler implementation-it can be arbitrary, as long as it satisfies these basic assumptions and runs infinitely long. We discuss an example of a scheduler that conforms to these assumptions in Section 4.
The rule for event α r d
ensures that the scheduler updates the appropriate part of the threadpool (low or high, depending on α) with newly created threads. Operation N ( d) returns thread identifiers for d and generates fresh ones when new threads are spawn by fork or hfork. The rule for event r keeps track of a nonterminal step of thread r; as an effect, counter q is decremented. A terminal step of thread r results in a r × event, which requires the scheduler to remove thread r from the threadpool. Events ↑ • r and ↑ • r are driven by the scheduler's selection of thread r . Note the difference in selecting low and high threads. A low thread can only be selected if the value of s is •, as discussed above.
Events r • and • r are triggered by the hide and unhide commands, respectively. The scheduler handles event r • by moving the current thread from the low to the high part of the threadpool and setting s to •. Upon event • r, the scheduler moves the thread back to the low part of the threadpool, setting s to •.
Events r •× and • r× are triggered by hide and unhide, respectively, when they are the last commands to be executed by a thread. 
Semantics for threadpools
The interaction between threads and the scheduler takes place at the top level, the level of threadpool configurations. These configurations have the form | c, m, σ, ν| α → | c , m , σ , ν | , where α ranges over the same set of events as in the semantics for schedulers.
The semantics for threadpool configurations is displayed in Figure 4 . The dynamic thread creation rule is triggered when the running thread c r generates a thread creation event α d , where α is either • or •. This event is synchronized with scheduler event α r d that requests the scheduler to handle the new threads depending on whether α is high or low.
If c r does not spawn new threads or terminate, then its command rule is synchronized with scheduler event r . If c r terminates in a transition without labels, then scheduler event r × is required for synchronization in order to update the threadpool information in the scheduler memory. If c r terminates with • (resp., • ) then synchronization with r •× (resp., • r×) is required to record both termination and hiding (resp., unhiding).
Scheduler event ↑ α r triggers a selection of a new thread r without affecting the commands in the threadpool or their memory. Finally, entering and exiting the high part |cr, m| . If for some threadpool configuration cfg we have cfg → * cfg , where the threadpool of cfg is empty, then cfg terminates in cfg , denoted by cfg ⇓ cfg . Recall that schedulers always run infinitely; however, according to the above definition, the entire program terminates if there are no threads to schedule. We assume that m(cfg) extracts the program memory from threadpool configuration cfg .
On multi-level extensions
Although the semantics accommodates two security levels for threads, extensions to more levels do not pose significant challenges. Assume a security lattice L, where security levels are ordered by a partial order , with the intention to only allow leaks from data at level 1 to data at level 2 when 1 2 . The low-and-high policy discussed above forms a two-level lattice with elements low and high so that low high but high low . In the presence of a general security lattice, the threadpool is partitioned into as many parts as the number of security levels. Commands hide , unhide , and fork are parameterized over security level . Initially, all threads are in the ⊥-threadpool. Whenever a thread executes a hide command, it enters -threadpool. The semantics needs to ensure that no threads from -threadpools, for all such that may execute until the hidden thread reaches unhide . Naturally, command fork creates threads in -threadpool.
To illustrate the use of commands hide , unhide , and fork , we present the thread d in Figure 5 . We assume three security levels in our lattice: low , medium, and high, where low medium high. Commands c low , c medium , and c high describe low, medium, and high threads, respectively. Variables l, k, and h (and their prime versions) are associated with security levels low , medium, and high, respectively. The program starts by spawning three threads at different security levels. Before the first hide, the low -threadpool is composed by the threads d and c low , while threads c medium and c high are placed in the medium and high-threadpools, respectively. At this point, any of the threads can be scheduled. Once executed hide medium , thread c low is not scheduled for execution until reaching the command unhide medium . After executing the first branching instruction, hide high is executing. Then, thread c medium is not able to run and only d and c high can be executed at that point of the program. After executing unhide high , thread c medium can be scheduled to run. Finally, c low can be scheduled to run after executing unhide medium .
We will discuss how general multi-level security can be defined and enforced in Sections 4 and 5, respectively.
Security specification
We specify security for programs via noninterference. The attacker's view of program memory is defined by a low-equivalence relation = L such that m 1 = L m 2 if the projections of the memories onto the low variables are the same m 1 | L = m 2 | L . As formalized in Definition 4 below, a program is secure under some scheduler if for any two initial low-equivalent memories, whenever the two runs of the program terminate, then the resulting memories are also low-equivalent.
We generalize this statement to a class of schedulers, requiring schedulers to comply to the basic assumptions from Section 3 and also requiring that they themselves are not leaky, i.e., that schedulers satisfy a form of noninterference.
Scheduler-related events have different distinguishability levels. Events
,, r , r ×, ↑ • r , r •, • r, r •×, and • r× (where r is a low thread and r can be either a low or a high thread) operate on low threads and are therefore low events. On the other hand, events • r d
, r , r ×, ↑ • r , r •, • r, r •×, and • r× (where r and r are high threads) are high.
With the security partition defined on scheduler events, we specify the indistinguishability of scheduler configurations via low-bisimulation. Because we only consider deterministic schedulers, an equivalent trace-based definition is possible. However, we have chosen a bisimulation-based definition of indistinguishability because it is both intuitive and concise. The intuition behind indistinguishability of scheduler configurations is this: A candidate relation R is a low-bisimulation if the following conditions hold. For two configurations that are related by R, if one of them (say the first) can make a high step to some other configuration then this other configuration will be related to the second configuration. If none of the configurations can make a high step, but one of the configurations can make a low step, then the other one should also be able to make a low step with the same label and the resulting configurations must be related by R. Formally: 
Note the condition "if the case above cannot be applied", which corresponds to the case where none of the configurations can make a high step. Scheduler configurations are low-indistinguishable if there is a low-bisimulation that relates them:
Noninterference for schedulers requires low-bisimilarity under any memory: 
A form of scheduler independence is built in the definition by the universal quantification over all noninterferent schedulers. Although the universally quantified condition may appear difficult to guarantee, we will show that the security type system from Section 5 ensures that any typable program is secure. Note that this security definition is termination-insensitive [SM03] in that it ignores nonterminating program runs. Our approach can be applied to termination-sensitive security in a straightforward manner, although this is beyond the scope of this paper.
Fig. 7. Security type system
As common, noninterference can be expressed for a general security lattice L by quantifying over all security levels ∈ L and demanding two-level noninterference between data at levels 1 such that 1 (acting as low) and data at levels 2 such that 2 (acting as high).
Security type system
This section presents a security type system that enforces the security specification from the previous section. We proceed by going over the typing rules and stating the soundness theorem.
Typing rules
Figure 7 displays the typing rules for expressions and commands. Suppose Γ is a typing environment which includes security type information for variables (whether they are low or high) and two variables, pc and hc, ranging over security types (low or high). By convention, we write Γ v for Γ restricted to all variables but v.
Expression typing judgments have the form Γ e : τ where τ is low only if all variables in e (denoted FV(e)) are low. If there exists a high variable that occurs in e then τ must be high. Expression types make no use of type variables pc and hc.
Command typing judgments have the form Γ c : τ . As a starting point, let us see how the rules track sequential-style information flow. The assignment rule ensures that information cannot leak explicitly by assigning an expression that contains high variables into a low variable. Further, implicit flows are prevented by the programcounter mechanism [DD77, VSI96] . This mechanism ensures that no assignments to low variables are allowed in the branches of a control statement (if or while) when the guard of the control statement has type high. (We call such if's and while's high.) This is achieved by the program-counter type variable pc from the typing context Γ . The intended guarantee is that whenever Γ pc , pc → high c : τ then c may not assign to low variables. The typing rules ensure that branches of high if's and while's may only be typed in a high pc context. Security type variables hc (that describes hiding context) and τ (that describes the command type) help tracking information flow specific to the multithreaded setting. The main job of these variables is to record whether the current thread is in the high part of the threadpool (hc = high) or is in the low part (hc = low ). Command type τ reflects the level of the hiding context after the command execution.
The type rules for hide and unhide raise and lower the level of the thread, respectively. Condition τ e Γ (hc) for typing high if's and while's ensures that high control commands can only be typed under high hc, which enforces the requirement that high control statements should be executed by high threads.
The type system ensures that there are no fork (but possibly some hfork) commands in high control statements. This is entailed by the rule for fork, which requires low hc.
By removing the typing rules for hide, unhide, hfork, and the security type variables hc and τ from Figure 7 , we obtain a standard type system for securing information flow in sequential programs (cf. [VSI96] ). This illustrates that our type provides a general technique for modular extension of systems that track information flow in a sequential setting.
Extending the type system to an arbitrary security lattice L is straightforward: the main modification is that security levels in hide , unhide , and fork may be allowed only if the level of hc is also .
Soundness
We enlist some helpful lemmas for proving the soundness of the type system. The proofs of all lemmas, theorems, and corollaries are reported in the appendix. The first lemma states that high control commands must be typed with high hc. The following lemma states that commands with high guards and hforks cannot contain hide or unhide commands as part of them.
Lemma 2. If Γ hc,pc , pc → high, hc → high c : high, then c does not contain hide and unhide.
The following lemma states that threads in the high part of the threadpool do not update low variables.
The next lemma states that threads created by hfork always remain in the high part of the threadpool.
Lemma 4. If Γ hc,pc , hc → high, pc → high c : high and |c, m| α |c , m | and
As stated by the following lemma, threads that are moved to the low part of the threadpool are kept in the high part of it until an unhide instruction is executed. 
The following lemma states that threads in the low part of the threadpool preserve low-equivalence of memories.
Lemma 6. For a given command c such that
The next lemma states that threads remain in the low part of the threadpool as long as no hide instruction is executed. Another important lemma is that commands hide and unhide are matched in pairs.
Lemma 8. If Γ hc , hc → low hide; c : low , then there exist commands c and p such that c ∈ {c ; unhide, unhide, c ; unhide; p, unhide; p}, where c has no unhide commands.
In order to establish the security of typable commands, we need to firstly identify the following subpools of threads from a given configuration.
Definition 5. Given a scheduler memory ν and a thread pool c, we define the following subpools of threads:
These three subpools of threads, L( c) (low), H( c) (high) and EL( c) (eventually low), behave differently when the overall threadpool is run with low-equivalent initial memories. Threads from the low subpool match in the two runs, threads from the high subpool do not necessarily match (but they cannot update low memories in any event), and threads from the eventually low subpool will eventually match. The above intuition is captured by the following theorem. First, we define what "eventually match" means.
Definition 6. Given a command p, we define the relation eventually low, written ∼ el,p , on empty or singleton sets of threads as follows: out unhide instructions such that c ∈ {c ; unhide, unhide} and d ∈ {d ; unhide, unhide} or c ∈ {c ; unhide; p, unhide; p} and d ∈ {d ; unhide; p, unhide; p}.
Two traces that start with low-indistinguishable memories might differ on commands (although keeping the command type). We need to show that this difference will not affect the sequence of low-observable events and low-observable memory changes. In order to show this, we define an unwinding [GM84] property, which is similar to the low-bisimulation property for schedulers. This unwinding property below establishes an invariant on two configurations that is preserved by low steps in lock-step and is unchanged by high steps with any of the configurations.
Theorem 1. Given a command p and the multithreaded configurations
| c 1 , m 1 , σ 1 , ν 1 | and | c 2 , m 2 , σ 2 , ν 2 | so that m 1 = L m 2 , written as R 1 (m 1 , m 2 ), N ( c 1 ) = H( c 1 , ν 1 ) ∪ L( c 1 , ν 1 )∪EL( c 1 , ν 1 ), written as R 2 ( c 1 , ν 1 ), R 2 ( c 2 , ν 2 ), sets H( c 1 , ν 1 ), L( c 1 , ν 1 ), and EL( c 1 , ν 1 ) are disjoint, written as R 3 ( c 1 , ν 1 ), R 3 ( c 2 , ν 2 ), L( c 1 , ν 1 ) = L( c 2 , ν 2 ), writ- ten as R 4 ( c 1 , ν 1 , c 2 , ν 2 ), EL( c 1 , ν 1 ) ∼ el,p,te 1 EL( c 2 , ν 2 ), written as R 5 ( c 1 , ν 1 , c 2 , ν 2 , p), (Γ [hc → low ] c i : low ) i∈L( c1,ν1) , written as R 6 ( c 1 , ν 1 ), (Γ [hc → high, pc → high] c i : high) i∈H( c1 ,ν1)∪H( c2,ν2) , written as R 7 ( c 1 , ν 1 , c 2 , ν 2 ), (Γ [hc → high] c i : low ) i∈EL( c1,ν1)∪EL( c2,ν2) , written as R 8 ( c 1 , ν 1 , c 2 , ν 2 ), and |σ 1 , ν 1 | ∼ L |σ 2 , ν 2 | , written as R 9 (σ 1 , ν 1 , σ 2 , ν 2 ), then: i) if | c i , m i , σ i , ν i | α → | c i , m i , σ i , ν i | where α is high and i ∈ {1, 2}, then there ex- ists p such that R 1 (m i , m 3−i ), R 2 ( c i , ν i ), R 2 ( c 3−i , ν 3−i ), R 3 ( c i , ν i ), R 3 ( c 3−i , ν 3−i ), R 4 ( c i , ν i , c 3−i , ν 3−i ), R 5 ( c i , ν i , c 3−i , ν 3−i , p ), R 6 ( c i , ν i ), R 7 ( c i , ν i , c 3−i , ν 3−i ), R 8 ( c i , ν i , c 3−i , ν 3−i ), and R 9 (σ i , ν i , σ 3−i , ν 3−i ); ii)
if the above case cannot be applied, and if
Corollary 1 (Soundness). If Γ hc , hc → low c : low then c is secure.
Extension to cooperative schedulers
It is possible to extend our model to cooperative schedulers. This is done by a minor modification of the semantics and type system rules. One can show that the results from Section 5 are preserved under these modifications.
The language is extended with primitive yield whose semantics is as follows:
The semantics for commands also needs to propagate label in the sequential composition rules. Event signals to the scheduler that the current thread yields control. The scheduler semantics needs to react to such an event by resetting counter q to 0:
We need to ensure that the only possibility to schedule another thread is by generating event . Hence, we add premise q = ∞ to the semantics rules for schedulers that handle events ↑ • r and ↑ • r . Additionally, the last rule in Figure 4 now allows α to range over {r •, • r, r }, which propagates yielding events from threads to the scheduler. Similar to scheduler events r •× and • r×, a new transition is added to the threadpool semantics to include the case when yield is executed as the last command by a thread. At the type-system level, yielding control while inside a high control command, as well as inside hide/unhide pairs, is potentially dangerous. These situations are avoided by a type rule for yield that restricts pc and hc to low:
A theorem that implies soundness for the modified type system can be proved similarly to Theorem 1.
Recently, we have suggested a mechanism for enforcing security under cooperative scheduling [RS06b] . Besides checking for explicit and implicit flows, the mechanism ensures that there are no yield commands in high context. Similarly, the rule above implies that yield may not appear in high context. On the other hand, the mechanism from [RS06b] allows no dynamic thread creation in high context. This is improved by the approach sketched in this section, because it retains the flexibility that is offered by hfork.
Ticket purchase example
In Section 2, we have argued that a flexible treatment of dynamic thread creation is paramount for a practical security mechanism. We illustrate, by an example, that the security type system from Section 5 offers such a permissive treatment without compromising security.
Consider the code fragment in Figure 8 . This fragment is a part of a program that handles a ticket purchase. Variables have subscripts indicating their security levels (l for low and h for high). Suppose f l contains public data for the flight being booked
The next line is a control statement: if the updated number m h +n l of miles exceeds 50000 then a new thread is spawn to perform a status update updateStatus for the passenger. The status update code involves a computation for extra miles (due to the passenger status) and might involve a request changeStatus to the status database. As potentially time-consuming computation, it is arranged in a separate thread. The final computation in the main thread prints the ticket.
This program creates threads in a high context because the guard of the if in the main thread depends on m h . Furthermore, the main thread contains an assignment to a low variable (ok l ) after the instructions that branches on secrets. Because of this, the program is rejected by the type systems of Smith [Smi01] as well as Boudol and Castellani [BC01, BC02] . Nevertheless, a minor modification of the program (which can be easily automated) by replacing if (m h + n l > 50000) then fork(s h := GOLD, updateStatus) with hide; if(m h + n l > 50000) then hfork(s h := GOLD, updateStatus) else skip; unhide results in a typable (and therefore secure) program.
Feasibility study of an implementation
As discussed in Section 2, it is important that the proposed security mechanism for regulating the interaction between threads and the scheduler is feasible to put into effect in practice.
We have analyzed two well-known thread libraries: the GNU Pth [Eng05] and the NPTL [DM03] libraries for the cooperative and preemptive concurrent model, respectively. Generally, the cooperative model has been widely used in, for instance, GUI programming, when few computations are performed, and most of the time the system waits for events. The preemptive model is popular in operating systems, where preemption is essential for resource management. We have not analyzed the libraries in full detail, focusing on a feasibility study of the presented interaction between threads and the scheduler.
The GNU Pth library is well known by its high level of portability and by only using threads in user space. This library is suitable to implement the primitives hide and unhide as well as a scheduler based on the round-robin policy from Section 4. Besides reacting to the commands hide and unhide, the scheduler could be modified to include one list of threads for each security level, in this case, low and high. Such scheduler interchangeably chooses between elements of those lists depending on the value of s (i.e., low and high threads when s = •, and only high ones otherwise). Based on these ideas, the work described in [TRH07] implements the scheduler of a library that provides information-flow security for multithreaded programs.
On the other hand, the NPTL library is more complex. It maps threads in user space to threads in kernel space by using low-level primitives in the code. Nevertheless, it would be possible to apply the similar modifications that we described for the GNU Pth library. The interaction between threads and the scheduler becomes more subtle in this model due to the operations performed at the kernel space. The responsiveness of the kernel for the whole system would depend on temporal properties of code wrapped by hide and unhide primitives.
Synchronization primitives
Synchronization mechanisms are of fundamental importance to concurrent programs. We focus on semaphores [Dij02] because they are simple yet widely used synchronization primitives. In principle, the language described in Section 3 allows synchronization of threads by implementing busy waiting algorithms. While making synchronization possible, these algorithms also introduce performance degradation. Conversely, blocked waiting, which commonly underlies semaphore implementations, does not have this drawback. Semaphores, and generally any other mechanism based on blocked waiting, can potentially affect the security of programs. Therefore, it is important to provide policies regarding the utilization of such primitives in order to guarantee confidentiality. In this section, we extend the language, semantics and type system described previously to include semaphores primitives and provably show that noninterference is preserved for well-typed programs.
Extended language
The extended syntax of the language is displayed in Figure 9 . A semaphore is a special variable, written sem, that ranges over nonnegative integers and can only be manipulated by two commands: wait(sem) and signal(sem). We assume, without losing .
Extended semantics for schedulers
Threads that are blocked on semaphore variables cannot be scheduled. Clearly, schedulers need to know when threads are blocked (or not) in order to decide if they can be chosen to run. For this purpose, we introduce a new scheduler variable t w that stores the set of blocked threads. The semantic rules involving this variable are shown in Fig 
Extended semantics for threadpools
The action of blocking and unblocking threads occurs at the level of threadpool configurations. For that reason, such configurations are extended with FIFO queues of waiting threads. More precisely, the extended threadpool configurations have the form | c, m, σ, ν, w| where w is a function from semaphores to a list of blocked threads. Semantic rules in Figure 4 are easily extended to consider w into account and therefore we omit the details here. Observe that the extended version of those rules do not modify w since they do not block or unblock threads at all.
Semantic rules for semaphore operations at the level of threadpools are shown in Figure 12 . Event b r sem is triggered when the top level configuration receives a b(sem) signal and the blocked thread is placed at the end of the queue associated with sem. When a u(sem) signal is generated by the running thread, it awakes the first thread in the queue associated with sem and triggers event u r sem . Moreover, it communicates to fork(skip, wait(s2); l := 0; signal(p); signal(f )); fork(skip, wait(s1); l := 1; signal(p); signal(f )); if h ≥ 0 then signal(s1); wait(p); signal(s2) else signal(s2); wait(p); signal(s1); wait(p); wait(f ); wait(f ); 
Attacks using semaphores
Confidentiality of data might be compromised if commands related to semaphores are freely allowed in programs. To illustrate this, we show an attack in Figure 13 . The program contains semaphore variables s 1 , s 2 , p, and f , and variables h and l to store secret and public data, respectively. The code blocks and unblocks threads that assign to public variables in an order that depends on h. That is, the execution of l := 1 is followed by l := 0 when h ≥ 0, and l := 0 is followed by l := 1 otherwise. Observe that the branching command presents no timing differences. Nevertheless, some information about h is revealed. Restrictions on the use of semaphores are needed in order to avoid such leaks.
Extended security specification
In Section 4, we state that a program is secure under some scheduler if for any two initial low-equivalence memories, whenever the two runs of the program terminate, then the resulting memories are also low-equivalent. Since semaphores variables are stored in programs memories as any other variables, the low-equivalent relation, as defined previously, is enough to capture the attacker's view of memories even in the presence of semaphores. However, the notion of "configuration cfg terminates in configuration cfg " needs to be adapted. An entire program terminates if there are no blocked threads and no threads to schedule. More precisely, cfg ⇓ cfg if cfg → * cfg where the threadpool of cfg is empty and the waiting queue w(sem) is empty for every semaphore sem.
To maintain the assumption that schedulers are not leaky, it is necessary to extend the low-bisimulation defined in Section 4 with the events related to synchronization. The distinguishability level of events b r sem , u r sem , b r sem ×, and u r sem × is the same as the security level of thread r. Definitions 1, 2, and 3 can be easily extended to consider such events and we therefore omit the details here.
We introduce a low-equivalence relation on queues of waiting threads. We define such relation as = L where w 1 = L w 2 if for every low semaphore sem, it holds that w 1 (sem) = w 2 (sem). We are now in condition to present the extended security specification: 
Extended type system
The type system proposed in Section 5 is extended to enforce secure uses of semaphores. As for variables, semaphores have security types (low or high) associated with them, which are included in the typing environment Γ . Typing rules for semaphore commands are depicted in Figure 14 . The first rule establishes that signals to any semaphore can be performed in low threads. However, signals to public semaphores cannot be sent from high threads. To illustrate why this restriction is imposed, we can think about signals on low semaphores as updates on low variables, which must be avoided inside of high threads. The second rule imposes that threads can only wait on semaphores that matches their security level. Waiting on semaphores at security level in threads of security level , where = , might affect the timing behavior of threads at security level and . For instance, waiting on high semaphores in low threads might affect low threads timing behavior depending on some secret data and lead to internal timing leaks. Moreover, waiting on low semaphores in high threads might affect, also through internal timing, how assignments to public variables are performed. To illustrate this, we show an example in Figure 15 . The code involves high thread d 1 , low threads d 2 and d 3 , low semaphore s l , and variables h and l to store secret and public information, respectively. Let us assume a scheduler that picks thread d 1 first and then proceeds to run threads for 15 steps before yielding the control. In this case, d 1 terminates before yielding. After that, depending on the secret, two scenarios are possible. If h ≥ 0, then d 2 blocks until d 3 completes its execution and produces 0 as the final value of l. If h < 0, on the other hand, d 2 is likely to execute l := 0 before d 3 runs l := 1. The final value of l is then 1, which demonstrates that the program is insecure.
The restrictions enforced by the type system are summarized in Figure 16 . The first and second columns describe the use of wait() and signal(), respectively. The first and second rows describe the use of semaphores in low and high threads, respectively. In addition, s l (resp., s h ) means that low (resp., high) semaphores can be safely used. 
Soundness of the extension
It is straightforward to see that the lemmas in Section 5.2 hold for the extended language. In fact, the requirements on their typing rules can be thought as requirements for assignments of some variables where their security levels have hc as lower bound. This condition is weaker than the one applied in the typing rule for assignments. Consequently, it is not surprising that every lemma holds considering the synchronization primitives wait and signal. In order to prove the security of typable commands, we define an operator N (w) that returns, for every semaphore sem, the thread identifiers in w(sem). We then identify the following subpools of blocked threads for a given configuration.
Definition 8. Given a scheduler memory ν and a function w from semaphores to a list of blocked threads, we define the following subpools of blocked threads:
, and BEL(w, ν) = {c i } i∈te∩N (w) .
Definition 6 is extended to include the fact that eventually low threads might be blocked on high semaphores. The notion of "eventually match" is now described in terms of tuples. The status, blocked or unblocked, of such threads depends on which components of the tuples they are situated. More precisely, we have the following definition:
Definition 9. Given a command p, we define the relation eventually low, written ∼ el,p , on tuples of empty or singleton sets of threads as follows:
∅, {c} ∼ el,p,{n} {d}, ∅; ∅, {c} ∼ el,p,{n} ∅, {d}; {c}, ∅ ∼ el,p,{n} {d}, ∅; {c}, ∅ ∼ el,p,{n} ∅, {d} ; where N (c) = N (d) = n, and there exist commands c and d without unhide instructions such that c ∈ {c ; unhide, unhide} and d ∈ {d ; unhide, unhide} or c ∈ {c ; unhide; p, unhide; p} and d ∈ {d ; unhide; p, unhide; p}.
The following definition indicates that blocked high and low threads are placed in the waiting list of high and low semaphores, respectively.
Definition 10. Given a typing environment Γ , an scheduler memory ν, and queues of blocked threads, we define w v iff for any sem
This leads us to the following soundness theorem, which extends Theorem 1 with invariants R 10−17 concerning blocked threads.
Theorem 2. Given a command p and the multithreaded configurations
, R 4 ( c 1 , ν 1 , c 2 , ν 2 ), the eventually low relationship BEL(w 1 , ν 1 ), EL( c 1 , ν 1 ) ∼ el,p,te 1 EL( c 2 , ν 2 ), BEL(w 2 , ν 2 ), written as R 5 ( c 1 , w 1 , ν 1 , c 2 , w 2 , ν 2 , p), R 6 ( c 1 , ν 1 ), R 7 ( c 1 , ν 1 , c 2 , ν 2 ), R 8 ( c 1 , ν 1 , c 2 , ν 2 ), R 9 (σ 1 , ν 1 , σ 2 , ν 2 ), N (w 1 ) = BL(w 1 , ν 1 ) ∪ BH ( w 1 , ν 1 )∪BEL(w 1 , ν 1 ), written R 10 (w 1 , ν 1 ), R 10 (w 2 , ν 2 ), sets BH(w 1 , ν 1 ), BL(w 1 , ν 1 ), BEL( w 1 , ν 1 ), and N ( c 1 ) are disjoint, written as R 11 ( w 1 , ν 1 ), R 11 (w 2 , ν 2 ), BL(w 1 , ν 1 ) = BL(w 2 , ν 2 ), written as R 12 (w 1 , ν 1 , w 2 , ν 2 ), (Γ [hc → low ] c i : low ) i∈BL(w1,ν1) , written as R 13 (w 1 , ν 1 ), (Γ [hc → high, pc → high] c i : high) i∈BH(w1 ,ν1)∪BH(w2,ν2) , written as R 14 (w 1 , ν 1 , w 2 , ν 2 ), (Γ [hc → high] c i : low ) i∈BEL(w1,ν1)∪BEL(w2,ν1) , written as R 15 (w 1 , ν 1 , w 2 , ν 2 ), w 1 = L w 2 , written as R 16 (w 1 , w 2 ), w 1 ν 1 , written as R 17 (w 1 , ν 1 ), R 17 (w 2 , ν 2 ), then:
, and R 17 (w 3−i , ν 3−i ); ii) if the above case cannot be applied, and given 
Compared with Theorem 1, Theorem 2 has new invariants, described by R 10 − R 17 , and applies the extended definition of the eventually low relationship in R 5 . Intuitively, invariants R 10 and R 11 establish that the subpools of blocked threads introduced in Definition 8 form a partition of the blocked threads found in the configuration. Invariant R 12 determines that the subpools of low blocked threads are the same in both configurations. Invariants R 13 − R 15 establish the typing requirements for the subpools of blocked threads. A subpool of blocked threads at some security level is typed under the same circumstances that live threads at that security level. Observe the similarities between R 6 − R 8 and R 13 − R 15 . Invariant R 16 establishes that threads blocked on low semaphores are the same in both configurations. Invariant R 17 determines that the blocked threads present in the configuration match the blocked threads registered by the scheduler.
Corollary 2 (Soundness).
If Γ hc , hc → low c : low then c is secure.
Conclusion
We have argued for a tight interaction between threads and the scheduler in order to guarantee secure information flow in multithreaded programs. In conclusion, we revisit the goals set in the paper's introduction and report the degree of success meeting these goals.
Permissiveness A key improvement over previous approaches is a permissive, yet secure, treatment of dynamic thread creation. Even if threads are created in a sensitive context, the flexible scheduling mechanism allows these threads to perform useful computation. This is particularly satisfying because it is an encouraged pattern to perform time-consuming computation (such as establishing network connections) in separate threads [Knu02, Mah04] .
Scheduler-independence
In contrast to known approaches to internal timing-sensitive approaches, the underlying security specification is robust with respect to a wide class of schedulers. However, the schedulers supported by the definition need to satisfy a form of noninterference that disallows information transfer from threads created in a sensitive context to threads with publicly observable effects. Sections 4 and 8 argue that such scheduler properties are not difficult to achieve.
Realistic semantics
The underlying semantics does not appeal to the nonstandard construct protect. The semantics, however, features additional hide, unhide, and hfork primitives. In contrast to protect, these features are directly implementable, as discussed in Section 8.
Language expressiveness As discussed earlier, a flexible treatment of dynamic thread creation is a part of our model. So is synchronization, as elaborated in Section 9. Note that our typing rules do not force a separated use of low and high semaphores by low and high threads, respectively. For example, signaling on a high semaphore by a low thread is allowed. However, input/output primitives are also desirable features. We expect a natural extension of our model with input/output primitives on channels labeled with security levels, similarly to semaphores that operate on different security levels. For the two-point security lattice, we imagine the following extension of the type system. Low channels would allow low threads to input to low variables and to output low expressions: similarly to low semaphores s that permit low threads to execute both P(s) and V(s) operations. High channels would allow high threads to input/output data and allow low threads to output data: similarly to high semaphores that allow high threads s to perform both P(s) and V(s) operations and allow low threads to perform V(s). Formalizing this intuition is subject to our future work.
Practical enforcement
We have demonstrated that security can be enforced for both cooperative and preemptive schedulers using a compositional type system. The type system accommodates permissive programming. We have illustrated by an example in Section 7 that the permissiveness of dynamic thread creation is not majorly restricted by the type system. The type system does not involve padding to eliminate timing leaks at the cost of efficiency.
Most recently, together with Barthe and Rezk [BRRS07] , we have adapted our type system to an unstructured assembly language. Our future work plans include handling richer low-level languages (such as languages with exceptions and bytecode) and facilitating tool support for them. Proof. By case analysis on c. Observe that the only typable command under the hypothesis of the lemma is the sequential composition.
Lemma 6. For a given command c such that Γ hc , hc → low c : low , memories m 1 and m 2 such that m 1 = L m 2 , and |c,
Proof. By case analysis on c and by exploring its type derivation.
Lemma 7. If Γ hc,pc , pc → τ c , hc → low c : low for some given τ c and |c, m| α |c , m | , where c = stop and α = r
•, then Γ hc,pc , pc → τ c , hc → low c : low .
Proof. By case analysis on c and inspection of the typing rules.
Proof. By induction on the size of command c.
Theorem 1. Given a command p and the multithreaded configurations
ii) if the above case cannot be applied, and if
Proof. By case analysis on command/scheduler steps. We are only going to show the proofs for the mentioned commands when the configuration | c 1 , m 1 , σ 1 , ν 1 | makes some progress. We assume that the thread c r belongs to c 1 . Analogous proofs are obtained when | c 2 , m 2 , σ 2 , ν 2 | makes progress instead. We make a distinction if the system performs an step that produces a low or a high event. ( c 1 , ν 1 ) ).
i) High events
) holds and because the transition α 1 does not affect the low threads (only high threads were created). For a similar reason, R 6 ( c 1 , ν 1 ) also holds. R 9 (σ 1 , ν 1 , σ 2 , ν 2 ) holds since R 9 (σ 1 , ν 1 , σ 2 , ν 2 ) holds and by applying the definition of ∼ L . In order to prove R 5 ( c 1 , ν 1 , c 2 , ν 2 , p ), R 7 ( c 1 , ν 1 , c 2 , ν 2 ), and R 8 ( c 1 , ν 1 , c 2 , ν 2 ), we need to split the proof in two more cases: c r ∈ H( c 1 , ν 1 ) and c r ∈ EL( c 1 , ν 1 ).
c r ∈ H( c 1 , ν 1 )) By taking p = p, we have that R 5 ( c 1 , ν 1 , c 2 , ν 2 , p) and proposition R 8 ( c 1 , ν 1 , c 2 , ν 2 ) hold because R 5 ( c 1 , ν 1 , c 2 , ν 2 , p), and R 8 ( c 1 , ν 1 , c 2 , ν 2 ) hold; and because the eventually low thread, if there exists one, has made no progress. Finally, R 7 ( c 1 , ν 1 , c 2 , ν 2 ) holds since R 7 ( c 1 , ν 1 , c 2 , ν 2 ) holds and by applying Lemma 4 to c r . c r ∈ EL( c 1 , ν 1 )) Since R 5 ( c 1 , ν 1 , c 2 , ν 2 , p) holds, we know that the thread with name r belongs to the threadpool c 2 . Moreover, we know that c r =hfork(c, d);
c ; unhide, c r = hfork(c, d); unhide, c r = hfork(c, d); c ; unhide; p, or c r = hfork(c, d); unhide; p, where c has no unhide commands. Then, R 5 ( c 1 , ν 1 , c 2 , ν 2 , p ) holds by taking p = p. R 8 ( c 1 , ν 1 , c 2 , ν 2 ) holds by Lemma 5. Finally, R 7 ( c 1 , ν 1 , c 2 , ν 2 ) holds since R 7 ( c 1 , ν 1 , c 2 , ν 2 ) holds and because high threads have made no progress. α 1 = r ) We split the proof in two more cases: c r ∈ H( c 1 , ν 1 ) and c r ∈ EL( c 1 , ν 1 ).
, and R 3 ( c 2 , ν 2 ) hold, and by inspecting the semantics for the scheduler. R 4 ( c 1 , ν 1 , c 2 , ν 2 ) holds since R 4 ( c 1 , ν 1 , c 2 , ν 2 ) holds and because the transition α 1 does not affect the low threads. For a similar reason, R 6 ( c 1 , ν 1 ) also holds. R 7 ( c 1 , ν 1 , c 2 , ν 2 ) holds since R 7 ( c 1 , ν 1 , c 2 , ν 2 ) holds and by applying Lemma 4. By taking p = p, we have that R 5 ( c 1 , ν 1 , c 2 , ν 2 , p ) and R 8 ( c 1 , ν 1 , c 2 , ν 2 ) hold because R 5 ( c 1 , ν 1 , c 2 , ν 2 , p), and R 8 ( c 1 , ν 1 , c 2 , ν 2 ) hold; and because the eventually low thread, if there exists one, has made no progress. R 9 (σ 1 , ν 1 , σ 2 , ν 2 ) holds since R 9 (σ 1 , ν 1 , σ 2 , ν 2 ) holds and by applying the definition of ∼ L . c r ∈ EL( c 1 , ν 1 )) R 1 (m 1 , m 2 ) holds by applying Lemma 5. R 2 ( c 1 , ν 1 ), R 2 ( c 2 , ν 2 ), R 3 ( c 1 , ν 1 ), and R 3 ( c 2 , ν 2 ), hold since R 2 ( c 1 , ν 1 ), R 2 ( c 2 , ν 2 ), R 3 ( c 1 , ν 1 ), and R 3 ( c 2 , ν 2 ) hold, and by inspecting the semantics for the scheduler. R 4 ( c 1 , ν 1 , c 2 , ν 2 ) holds since R 4 ( c 1 , ν 1 , c 2 , ν 2 ) holds and because the transition α 1 does not affect the low threads. For a similar reason, R 6 ( c 1 , ν 1 ) also holds.
Since
α 1 = r × ) We need to split the proof in two more cases: c r ∈ H( c 1 , ν 1 ) and c r ∈ EL( c 1 , ν 1 ).
, and R 3 ( c 2 , ν 2 ) hold, and by inspecting the semantics for the scheduler. R 4 ( c 1 , ν 1 , c 2 , ν 2 ) holds since R 4 ( c 1 , ν 1 , c 2 , ν 2 ) holds and because the transition α 1 does not affect the low threads. For a similar reason, R 6 ( c 1 , ν 1 ) also holds. R 7 ( c 1 , ν 1 , c 2 , ν 2 ) holds since R 7 ( c 1 , ν 1 , c 2 , ν 2 ) holds and because the thread c r has finished. By taking p = p, we have that R 5 ( c 1 , ν 1 , c 2 , ν 2 , p) and R 8 ( c 1 , ν 1 , c 2 , ν 2 ) hold because R 5 ( c 1 , ν 1 , c 2 , ν 2 , p), and R 8 ( c 1 , ν 1 , c 2 , ν 2 ) hold; and because the eventually low thread, if there exists one, has made no progress. R 9 (σ 1 , ν 1 , σ 2 , ν 2 ) holds since R 9 (σ 1 , ν 1 , σ 2 , ν 2 ) holds and by applying the definition of ∼ L . c r ∈ EL( c 1 , ν 1 )) The eventually low thread cannot make progress and finishes immediately. Observe that c r must be typable as Γ [hc → high] c r : low and it must terminate in one step. Therefore, c r = unhide but this cannot occur since α 1 = r ×.
( c 1 , ν 1 , c 2 , ν 2 ) and R 8 ( c 1 , ν 1 , c 2 , ν 2 ) hold and because the transition has only mod-ified the variable t r in the scheduler. R 9 (σ 1 , ν 1 , σ 2 , ν 2 ) holds since R 9 (σ 1 , ν 1 , σ 2 , ν 2 ) holds and by applying the definition of ∼ L .
ii) Low events :
• r e , r •×, and • r e × (where {r, r } ⊆ L( c 1 , ν 1 ) and r e ∈ t e1 EL( c 1 , ν 1 )). In addition to that, we also know that c r ∈ L( c 2 , ν 2 ) since L( c 2 , ν 2 ) = L( c 1 , ν 1 ), and that |c r , m 2 |
holds by applying Lemma 6. R 2 ( c 1 , ν 1 ), R 2 ( c 2 , ν 2 ), R 3 ( c 1 , ν 1 ), and R 3 ( c 2 , ν 2 ) hold since propositions R 2 ( c 1 , ν 1 ), R 2 ( c 2 , ν 2 ), R 3 ( c 1 , ν 1 ), and R 3 ( c 2 , ν 2 ) holds, and by inspecting the semantics for the scheduler together with the fact that N ( d) are fresh names for threads. R 4 ( c 1 , ν 1 , c 2 , ν 2 ) holds since R 4 ( c 1 , ν 1 , c 2 , ν 2 ) holds and because the transition α 1 added the same new low threads to both configurations. By taking p = p, we have that R 5 ( c 1 , ν 1 , c 2 , ν 2 , p) holds since proposition R 5 ( c 1 , ν 1 , c 2 , ν 2 , p) holds and because the eventually low thread, if exists one, has made no progress. R 6 ( c 1 , ν 1 ) holds since R 6 ( c 1 , ν 1 ) holds and by inspecting the Lemma 7. R 7 ( c 1 , ν 1 , c 2 , ν 2 ) holds R 7 ( c 1 , ν 1 , c 2 , ν 2 ) holds and because high threads have been not modified by the low step α 1 . R 8 ( c 1 , ν 1 , c 2 , ν 2 ) holds R 8 ( c 1 , ν 1 , c 2 , ν 2 ) holds and because the eventually low threads in both configurations, if they exists, have been not modified by the step α 1 . Finally, proposition R 9 (σ 1 , ν 1 , σ 2 , ν 2 ) holds since R 9 (σ 1 , ν 1 , σ 2 , ν 2 ) holds and by applying the definition of ∼ L . α 1 = r ) By inspecting the semantics rules for threadpools, the scheduler, and commands, we have that c r ∈ L( c 1 , ν 1 ), |c r , m 1 | |c , m 1 | , and that |σ 1 , ν 1 | r |σ 1 , ν 1 | . Because |σ 1 , ν 1 | ∼ L |σ 2 , ν 2 | and α 1 is low, we also have that |σ 2 , ν 2 | r |σ 2 , ν 2 | . In addition to that, we also know that c r ∈ L( c 2 , ν 2 ) since L( c 2 , ν 2 ) = L( c 1 , ν 1 ), and that |c r , m 2 | |c , m 2 | . Therefore, we can conclude that the transition | c 2 , m 2 , σ 2 , ν 2 | r | c 2 , m 2 , σ 2 , ν 2 | holds. R 1 (m 1 , m 2 ) holds by applying Lemma 6 to c r . R 2 ( c 1 , ν 1 ), R 2 ( c 2 , ν 2 ), R 3 ( c 1 , ν 1 ), and R 3 ( c 2 , ν 2 ) hold since R 2 ( c 1 , ν 1 ), R 2 ( c 2 , ν 2 ), R 3 ( c 1 , ν 1 ), and R 3 ( c 2 , ν 2 ) holds, and by inspecting the semantics for the scheduler. R 4 ( c 1 , ν 1 , c 2 , ν 2 ) holds since R 4 ( c 1 , ν 1 , c 2 , ν 2 ) holds and by applying Lemma 6 to c r . By taking p = p, we have that R 5 ( c 1 , ν 1 , c 2 , ν 2 , p) holds since R 5 ( c 1 , ν 1 , c 2 , ν 2 , p) holds and because the eventually low threads, if they exist, have made no progress. R 6 ( c 1 , ν 1 ) holds since R 6 ( c 1 , ν 1 ) holds and by applying Lemma 7 to c r . R 7 ( c 1 , ν 1 , c 2 , ν 2 ) holds since R 7 ( c 1 , ν 1 , c 2 , ν 2 ) and because high threads have been not modified by the transition α 1 . R 8 ( c 1 , ν 1 , c 2 , ν 2 ) holds since R 8 ( c 1 , ν 1 , c 2 , ν 2 ) holds and because the eventually low threads in both configurations, if they exist, have been not modified by the transition α 1 . Finally, R 9 (σ 1 , ν 1 , σ 2 , ν 2 ) holds since R 9 (σ 1 , ν 1 , σ 2 , ν 2 ) holds and by applying the definition of ∼ L . α 1 = r × ) By inspecting the semantics for threadpools, the scheduler, and commands, we have that c r ∈ L( c 1 , ν 1 ), |c r , m 1 | |stop, m 1 | , and that |σ 1 , ν 1 | r × |σ 1 , ν 1 | . Because |σ 1 , ν 1 | ∼ L |σ 2 , ν 2 | and α 1 is low, we also have that |σ 2 , ν 2 | r × |σ 2 , ν 2 | . In addition to that, we also know that c r ∈ L( c 2 , ν 2 ) since L( c 2 , ν 2 ) = L( c 1 , ν 1 ), and that |c r , m 2 | |stop, m 2 | . We can therefore conclude that the transition | c 2 , m 2 , σ 2 , ν 2 | r × | c 2 , m 2 , σ 2 , ν 2 | holds.
R 1 (m 1 , m 2 ) holds by applying Lemma 6 to c r . R 2 ( c 1 , ν 1 ), R 2 ( c 2 , ν 2 ), R 3 ( c 1 , ν 1 ), and R 3 ( c 2 , ν 2 ) hold since R 2 ( c 1 , ν 1 ), R 2 ( c 2 , ν 2 ), R 3 ( c 1 , ν 1 ), and R 3 ( c 2 , ν 2 ) hold, and by inspecting the semantics for the scheduler (observe that the thread c r has just terminated). R 4 ( c 1 , ν 1 , c 2 , ν 2 ) holds since R 4 ( c 1 , ν 1 , c 2 , ν 2 ) holds and by applying Lemma 6 to c r . By taking p = p, we have that R 5 ( c 1 , ν 1 , c 2 , ν 2 , p) holds since R 5 ( c 1 , ν 1 , c 2 , ν 2 , p) holds and because the eventually low threads, if they exist, have made no progress. R 6 ( c 1 , ν 1 ) holds since R 6 ( c 1 , ν 1 ) holds and c r / ∈ L( c 1 , ν 1 ). R 7 ( c 1 , ν 1 , c 2 , ν 2 ) holds since R 7 ( c 1 , ν 1 , c 2 , ν 2 ) holds and because high threads have been not modified by the transition α 1 . R 8 ( c 1 , ν 1 , c 2 , ν 2 ) holds since R 8 ( c 1 , ν 1 , c 2 , ν 2 ) holds and because the eventually low threads in both configurations, if they exists, have been not modified by the transition α 1 . Finally, R 9 (σ 1 , ν 1 , σ 2 , ν 2 ) holds since R 9 (σ 1 , ν 1 , σ 2 , ν 2 ) holds and by applying the definition of ∼ L . α 1 =↑ • r ) By inspecting the semantics for threadpools and the scheduler, we have that
, ν 2 | and α 1 is low, we also have that |σ 2 , ν 2 | ↑•r |σ 2 , ν 2 | . We can therefore conclude that the transition
( c 1 , ν 1 , c 2 , ν 2 ), R 8 ( c 1 , ν 1 , c 2 , ν 2 ) holds and because the transition has only modified the variable t r in the scheduler. R 9 (σ 1 , ν 1 , σ 2 , ν 2 ) holds since R 9 (σ 1 , ν 1 , σ 2 , ν 2 ) holds and by applying the definition of ∼ L . α 1 = r •) By inspecting the semantics for threadpools, the scheduler, and commands, we have that c r = hide; c * for some command c * , |c r , m 1 |
• |c r , m 1 | ,
. Moreover, we know that |σ 1 , ν 1 | ∼ L |σ 2 , ν 2 | and α 1 is low, we also have that |σ 2 , ν 2 | r • |σ 2 , ν 2 | . We can thus conclude that the transition
We know that EL( c 1 ) = ∅ because a low thread was scheduled to produce the event r
•. Then, EL( c 2 ) = ∅ since R 5 ( c 1 , ν 1 , c 2 , ν 2 , p) holds. By applying Lemma 8 to c r , we know that c * = c ; unhide, c * = unhide, c * = c ; unhide; p * , or c * = unhide; p R 3 ( c 1 , ν 1 ), R 3 ( c 2 , ν 2 ), and R 4 ( c 1 , ν 1 , c 2 , ν 2 ) hold since the following equalities EL( c 1 ,
,2 hold by inspecting the semantics for threadpools and the scheduler.
In the cases where c * = c ; unhide or c * = unhide, R 5 ( c 1 , ν 1 , c 2 , ν 2 , p ) holds by taking p = skip (see Definition 6). On the other cases, by taking p = p * , we know that R 5 ( c 1 , ν 1 , c 2 , ν 2 , p * ) holds because the application of Lemma 8 gave us the appropriate p * that satisfies Definition 6. R 6 ( c 1 , ν 1 ) holds since L( c 1 , ν 1 ) = L( c 1 , ν 1 )\{c r } and R 6 ( c 1 , ν 1 ) hold. R 7 ( c 1 , ν 1 , c 2 , ν 2 ) holds since proposition R 7 ( c 1 , ν 1 , c 2 , ν 2 ) holds and because high threads have been not modified by the transition α 1 . R 8 ( c 1 , ν 1 , c 2 , ν 2 ) holds since R 8 ( c 1 , ν 1 , c 2 , ν 2 ) holds and by inspecting the type derivation of c r . Finally, proposition R 9 (σ 1 , ν 1 , σ 2 , ν 2 ) holds since R 9 (σ 1 , ν 1 , σ 2 , ν 2 ) holds and by applying the definition of ∼ L .
We know that r e ∈ t e1 . By inspecting the semantics for threadpools, the scheduler, and commands, we have that c re = unhide; c * or c re = unhide for some command c * , c re ∈ EL( c 1 , ν 1 ), |c re , m 1 |
• |c * , m 1 | , and that |σ 1 , ν 1 |
• re |σ 1 , ν 1 | . We are only going to consider the case when c re = unhide; c * since the proof for c re = unhide is analogous. Therefore, we omit the proof when α 1 = • r e ×. Because |σ 1 , ν 1 | ∼ L |σ 2 , ν 2 | and α 1 is low, we also have that |σ 2 , ν 2 |
• re |σ 2 , ν 2 | . Because R 5 ( c 1 , ν 1 , c 2 , ν 2 , p) holds, we know that c * = p and that the thread with name r e belongs to the threadpool c 2 as well. Let us call it c 2 re . Since R 5 ( c 1 , ν 1 , c 2 , ν 2 , p) holds and it is not possible for a thread to make progress by a high computation, we have that c 2 re = unhide; p. As a consequence of that, it holds that |c m 2 ) holds trivially since unhide has no changed the memories. R 2 ( c 1 , ν 1 ), R 2 ( c 2 , ν 2 ), R 3 ( c 1 , ν 1 ), and R 3 ( c 2 , ν 2 ) hold since R 2 ( c 1 , ν 1 ), R 2 ( c 2 , ν 2 ), R 3 ( c 1 , ν 1 ), and R 3 ( c 2 , ν 2 ) holds; and by inspecting the semantics for the scheduler. R 4 ( c 1 , ν 1 , c 2 , ν 2 ) holds since R 4 ( c 1 , ν 1 , c 2 , ν 2 ) holds and because after the transition α 1 , the threads c re and c 2 re become the thread p. By inspecting the semantics for the scheduler, we have that EL( c 1 , ν 1 ) = EL( c 2 , ν 2 ) = ∅. Then, by taking p = skip, it trivially holds that R 5 ( c 1 , ν 1 , c 2 , ν 2 , skip). R 6 ( c 1 , ν 1 ) holds since R 5 ( c 1 , ν 1 , c 2 , ν 2 , p) and R 7 ( c 1 , ν 1 , c 2 , ν 2 , p) holds ; and by inspecting the type derivation of c re . R 7 ( c 1 , ν 1 , c 2 , ν 2 ) holds since R 7 ( c 1 , ν 1 , c 2 , ν 2 ) holds and because high threads have been not modified by the transition α 1 . R 8 ( c 1 , ν 1 , c 2 , ν 2 ) holds since EL( c 1 , ν 1 ) = EL( c 2 , ν 2 ) = ∅. Finally, R 9 (σ 1 , ν 1 , σ 2 , ν 2 ) holds since R 9 (σ 1 , ν 1 , σ 2 , ν 2 ) holds and by applying the definition of ∼ L . α 1 = r •×) We know that r ∈ t •1 . The hypothesis in the theorem state that c r must be typable as Γ [hc → low ] c r : low by R 6 ( c 1 , ν 1 ). Observe that when c r = hide this requirement is violated. Therefore, this event can never occur under the given hypothesis.
| c 1 , m 1 , σ 1 , ν 1 | makes some progress. The proof for other commands proceeds similarly as in Theorem 1. We assume that the thread c r belongs to c 1 . Analogous proofs are obtained when | c 2 , m 2 , σ 2 , ν 2 | makes progress instead. ( c 1 , ν 1 ) ). m 2 ) holds by inspecting the semantics of threadpools and applying Lemma 3 to c r . By inspecting the threadpool semantics and since c r has been blocked, we have that N ( c 1 ) = N ( c 1 )\{c r }. Moreover, we have that
We also know that H( c 1 , ν 1 ) = H( c 1 , ν 1 ) \ {c r } since r ∈ t •1 and c r has been blocked. By this last fact and R 3 ( c 1 , ν 1 ), it holds R 2 ( c 1 , ν 1 ) as expected. R 2 ( c 2 , ν 2 ) holds since it already holds by hypothesis. R 3 ( c 1 , ν 1 ) holds since R 3 ( c 1 , ν 1 ) holds and H( c 1 , ν 1 ) = H( c 1 , ν 1 )\{c r }. R 3 ( c 2 , ν 2 ) holds since it already holds by hypothesis. R 4 ( c 1 , ν 1 , c 2 , ν 2 ) holds since low threads are not affected by the transition α 1 . By taking p = p, we have that R 5 ( c 1 , w 1 , ν 1 , c 2 , w 2 , ν 2 , p ) holds since R 5 ( c 1 , w 1 , ν 1 , c 2 , w 2 , ν 2 , p) holds and because the eventually low thread, if it exists, has made no progress. R 6 ( c 1 , ν 1 ) holds since R 6 ( c 1 , ν 1 ) holds and low threads have made no progress. R 7 ( c 1 , ν 1 , c 2 , ν 2 ) holds since R 7 ( c 1 , ν 1 , c 2 , ν 2 ) holds and
2 ) holds and because the eventually low thread, if exists one, has made no progress. Proposition R 9 (σ 1 , ν 1 , σ 2 , ν 2 ) holds since R 9 (σ 1 , ν 1 , σ 2 , ν 2 ) holds and by applying the definition of ∼ L . By inspecting the semantics of threadpools, we have that N (w 1 ) = N (w 1 ) ∪ {c r }. By rewriting N (w) according to R 10 (w 1 , ν 1 ), we know that N (w 1 ) = BL(w 1 , ν 1 ) ∪ BH(w 1 , ν 1 ) ∪ BEL(w 1 , ν 1 )∪{c r }. Since r ∈ t •1 , we also know that BH (w 1 , ν 1 ) = BH(w 1 , ν 1 ) ∪ {c r }. Consequently, R 10 (w 1 , ν 1 ) holds. Proposition R 10 (w 2 , ν 2 ) holds since it already holds by hypothesis. Proposition R 11 (w 1 , ν 1 ) holds since R 11 ( w 1 , ν 1 ) holds and because BH (w 1 , ν 1 ) = BH(w 1 , ν 1 ) ∪ {c r }. Proposition R 11 ( w 2 , ν 2 ) holds since it holds by hypothesis. Propositions R 12 (w 1 , ν 1 , w 2 , ν 2 ) and R 13 (w 1 , ν 1 ) hold since R 12 (w 1 , ν 1 , w 2 , ν 2 ) and R 13 (w 1 , ν 1 ) hold and because no blocked low threads are affected by the transition α 1 . By R 7 ( c 1 , ν 1 , c 2 , ν 2 ), R 14 (w 1 , ν 1 , w 2 , ν 2 ), Lemma 4 applied to c r , and the fact that BH (w 1 , ν 1 ) = BH(w 1 , ν 1 ) ∪ {c r }, we obtain that R 14 (w 1 , ν 1 , w 2 , ν 2 ) holds. Proposition R 15 (w 1 , ν 1 , w 2 , ν 2 ) and R 16 (w 1 , w 2 ) hold since R 15 (w 1 , ν 1 , w 2 , ν 2 ) and R 16 (w 1 , w 2 ) hold and because no low semaphores or the eventually low thread, if exists one, are affected by the transition α 1 . By inspecting the semantics, c r ∈ H( c 1 , ν 1 ), and R 7 ( c 1 , ν 1 , c 2 , ν 2 ), we have that Γ (sem) = high and r ∈ t •1 . By these last facts and R 17 (w 1 , ν 1 ), we obtain that R 17 (w 1 , ν 1 ) holds. R 17 (w 2 , ν 2 ) holds since it already holds by hypothesis. c r ∈ EL( c 1 , ν 1 ))
Propositions R 1−4 can be proved in a similar way as when c r ∈ H( c 1 , ν 1 ). By hypothesis, we know that BEL(w 1 , ν 1 ), EL( c 1 , ν 1 ) ∼ el,p,te 1 EL( c 2 , ν 2 ), BEL(w 2 , ν 2 ). By inspecting the semantics, we also know that t e1 = {c r }. By inspecting Definition 9, we have that ∅, {c r } ∼ el,p,te 1 EL( c 2 , ν 2 ), BEL(w 2 , ν 2 ). We need to do case analysis to determine if EL( c 2 , ν 2 ) = ∅ or BEL(w 2 , ν 2 ) = ∅. Both cases proceed in a similar way and therefore we omit when BEL(w 2 , ν 2 ) = ∅. Consequently, we have that ∅, {c r } ∼ el,p,te 1 ∅, {d r } where there exist commands c and d without unhide instructions such that c r ∈ {c ; unhide, unhide} and d r ∈ {d ; unhide, unhide} or c r ∈ {c ; unhide; p, unhide; p} and d r ∈ {d ; unhide; p, unhide; p}. Since the triggered event is b r sem , we can deduce that c r ∈ {c ; unhide} or c r ∈ {c ; unhide; p}. By inspecting the threadpool semantics, we have that |c r , m 1 | b(sem) |c r , m 1 | , where c r = stop. Consequently, we know that c r ∈ {c ; unhide, unhide} or c r ∈ {c ; unhide; p, unhide; p} where |c , m 1 | b(sem) |c , m 1 | . Let us take p = p. Since t w1 = t w1 ∪ {r} and t e1 = {r}, we have that BEL(w 1 , ν 1 ) = {c r }, EL( c 1 , ν 1 ) = ∅, and that {c r }, ∅ ∼ el,p ,te 1 ∅, {d r } holds. Therefore, R 5 ( c 1 , w 1 , ν 1 , c 2 , ν 2 , w 2 , p ) holds. Propositions R 6 ( c 1 , ν 1 ) and R 7 ( c 1 , ν 1 , c 2 , ν 2 ) hold since R 6 ( c 1 , ν 1 ) and R 7 ( c 1 , ν 1 , c 2 , ν 2 ) hold and because low and high threads have made no progress. Proposition R 8 ( c 1 , ν 1 , c 2 , ν 2 ) holds since R 8 ( c 1 , ν 1 , c 2 , ν 2 ) holds and EL( c 1 , ν 1 ) = ∅. Propositions R 9−13 are proved similarly as when c r ∈ H( c 1 , ν 1 ). Proposition R 14 (w 1 , ν 1 , w 2 , ν 2 ) holds since R 14 (w 1 , ν 1 , w 2 , ν 2 ) holds and because high threads have made no progress. By R 8 ( c 1 , ν 1 , c 2 , ν 2 ), applying Lemma 5 to c r , and R 15 (w 1 , ν 1 , w 2 , ν 2 ), we obtain that R 15 (w 1 , ν 1 , w 2 , ν 2 ) holds. Proposition R 16 (w 1 , w 2 ) holds since R 16 (w 1 , w 2 ) holds and because no low semaphores or the eventually low thread, if it exists, are affected by the transition. By inspecting the semantics, c r ∈ EL( c 1 , ν 1 ), and R 7 ( c 1 , ν 1 , c 2 , ν 2 ), we have that Γ (sem) = high and r ∈ t e1 . By these last facts and R 17 (w 1 , ν 1 ), we obtain that R 17 (w 1 , ν 1 ) holds. Proposition R 17 (w 2 , ν 2 ) holds since it already holds by hypothesis.
The proof proceeds similarly as when
By inspecting the semantics of threadpools, this event can be produced by two rules in Figure 12 . Which rule is applied depends on the existence of threads on the waiting list w 1 (sem) when executing signal, which is captured by the scheduler events u r r and u r a . The proof proceeds similarly in both cases. Therefore, we omit the case when the scheduler triggers the event u r r . c r ∈ H( c 1 , ν 1 )) R 1 (m 1 , m 2 ) holds by inspecting the semantics of threadpools and applying Lemma 3 to c r . By semantics, the thread c a has been awakened and place into the threadpool. Since R 17 (w 1 , ν 1 ) holds and Γ (sem) = high by R 7 ( c 1 , ν 1 , c 2 , ν 2 ), we have that a ∈ t •1 ∪ t e1 and consequently R 2 ( c 1 , ν 1 ) holds. Proposition R 2 ( c 2 , ν 2 ) holds since it holds by hypothesis. Proposition R 3 ( c 1 , ν 1 ) holds by R 3 ( c 1 , ν 1 ) and R 11 (w 1 , ν 1 ). Proposition R 3 ( c 2 , ν 2 ) holds since it holds already by hypothesis. Propositions R 4−6 can be proved in a similar way as when α 1 = b r sem . To prove proposition R 7 ( c 1 , ν 1 , c 2 , ν 2 ), we need to consider if a ∈ t •1 . If that is the case, it is proved by R 7 ( c 1 , ν 1 , c 2 , ν 2 ) and R 14 (w 1 , ν 1 , w 2 , ν 2 ). Otherwise, it holds since it already holds by hypothesis. To prove proposition R 8 ( c 1 , ν 1 , c 2 , ν 2 ), we need to consider if a ∈ t e1 . If that is the case, it is proved by R 8 ( c 1 , ν 1 , c 2 , ν 2 ) and R 15 (w 1 , ν 1 , w 2 , ν 2 ). Otherwise, it holds since it already holds by hypothesis. By inspecting the semantics, we know that N (w 1 ) = N (w 1 ) \ {c a } and that, depending if a ∈ t •1 or a ∈ t e1 , we have that BH (w 1 , ν 1 ) = BH(w 1 , ν 1 ) \ {c a } or BEL(w 1 , ν 1 ) = BEL(w 1 , ν 1 ) \ {c a }, respectively. Consequently, we obtain that R 10 (w 1 , ν 1 ) holds. Proposition R 10 (w 2 , ν 2 ) since it already holds by hypothesis. Proposition R 11 (w 1 , ν 1 ) holds since R 11 (w 1 , ν 1 ) holds and c a has been move from one subpool of threads to another. Proposition R 12 (w 2 , ν 2 ) holds since it already holds by hypothesis. Proposition R 13 (w 1 , ν 1 ) holds since R 13 (w 1 , ν 1 ) holds and no threads have been blocked by the transition α 1 . Propositions R 14 (w 1 , ν 1 , w 2 , ν 2 ) and R 15 (w 1 , ν 1 , w 2 , ν 2 ) hold since R 14 (w 1 , ν 1 , w 2 , ν 2 ) and R 15 (w 1 , ν 1 , w 2 , ν 2 ) hold and because c a has been removed from the subpool of threads BH (w 1 , ν 1 ) or BEL(w 1 , ν 1 ) by the transition α 1 . Since R 17 (w 1 , ν 1 ) holds and Γ (sem) = high by R 7 ( c 1 , ν 1 , c 2 , ν 2 ), it holds that w 1 = L w 1 and thus R 16 (w 1 , w 2 ) holds. Proposition R 17 (w 1 , ν 1 ) holds since R 17 (w 1 , ν 1 ) holds and c a has been removed from the waiting list of sem. Proposition R 17 (w 2 , ν 2 ) holds since it already holds by hypothesis. c r ∈ EL( c 1 , ν 1 ))
The proof of R 1−4 proceeds as when c r ∈ H( c 1 , ν 1 ). Proposition R 5 is proved as when α 1 = b r sem and c r ∈ EL( c 1 , ν 1 ). The rest of the propositions are proved similarly as when c r ∈ H( c 1 , ν 1 ). α 1 = u r sem × ) The proof proceeds similarly as when α 1 = u r sem .
ii) In this case, all the propositions are valid since they are valid already by hypothesis. Observe that no step in the semantics is performed. → | c 2 , m 2 , σ 2 , ν 2 , w 2 | . R 1 (m 1 , m 2 ) holds by applying Lemma 6 to c r . Propositions R 2 ( c 1 , ν 1 ), R 2 ( c 2 , ν 2 ), R 3 ( c 1 , ν 1 ), and R 3 ( c 2 , ν 2 ) hold since propositions R 2 ( c 1 , ν 1 ), R 2 ( c 2 , ν 2 ), R 3 ( c 1 , ν 1 ), R 3 ( c 2 , ν 2 ), R 10 (w 1 , ν 1 ) and R 10 (w 2 , ν 2 ) hold and since L( c 1 , ν 1 ) = L( c 1 , ν 1 ) \ {c r } by inspecting the semantics for threadpools. Proposition R 4 ( c 1 , ν 1 , c 2 , ν 2 ) holds since R 4 ( c 1 , ν 1 , c 2 , ν 2 ) holds and because the transition α 1 block the same low thread on both configurations.
By taking p = p, we have that R 5 ( c 1 , w 1 , ν 1 , c 2 , w 2 , ν 2 , p) holds since proposition R 5 ( c 1 , w 1 , ν 1 , c 2 , ν 2 , w 2 , p) holds and because the eventually low thread, if exists one, has made no progress. R 6 ( c 1 , ν 1 ) holds by R 6 ( c 1 , ν 1 ) and the fact that c r / ∈ L( c 1 , ν 1 ). R 7 ( c 1 , ν 1 , c 2 , ν 2 ) holds because R 7 ( c 1 , ν 1 , c 2 , ν 2 ) holds and because high threads have been not modified by the transition α 1 . R 8 ( c 1 , ν 1 , c 2 , ν 2 ) holds because R 8 ( c 1 , ν 1 , c 2 , ν 2 ) holds and because the eventually low threads in both configurations, if they exists, have been not modified by the transition α 1 . Proposition R 9 (σ 1 , ν 1 , σ 2 , ν 2 ) holds since R 9 (σ 1 , ν 1 , σ 2 , ν 2 ) holds and by applying the definition of ∼ L . By inspecting the semantics of threadpools, R 4 ( c 1 , ν 1 , c 2 , ν 2 ), and R 12 (w 1 , ν 1 , w 2 , ν 2 ), we have that N (w 1 ) = N (w 2 ) = N (w 1 )∪{c r }, N ( c 1 ) = N ( c 2 ) = N ( c 1 )\{c r }, and BL(w 1 , ν 1 ) = BL(w 2 , ν 2 ) = BL(w 1 , ν 2 ) ∪ {c r }. By these last facts, R 10 (w 1 , ν 2 ), R 10 (w 2 , ν 2 ), R 11 (w 1 , ν 1 ), R 11 (w 2 , ν 2 ), R 12 (w 1 , ν 1 , w 2 , ν 2 ), we have that it holds R 10 (w 1 , ν 2 ), R 10 (w 2 , ν 2 ), R 11 (w 1 , ν 1 ), R 11 (w 2 , ν 2 ), R 12 (w 1 , ν 1 , w 2 , ν 2 ). R 13 (w 1 , ν 1 ) holds since R 13 (w 1 , ν 1 ) holds and by Lemma 7. Proposition R 14 (w 1 , ν 1 , w 2 , ν 2 ) and R 15 (w 1 , ν 1 , w 2 , ν 2 ) holds since R 14 (w 1 , ν 1 , w 2 , ν 2 ) and R 15 (w 1 , ν 1 , w 2 , ν 2 ) holds and because transition α 1 does not affect high and eventually low threads, if they exists. Since c r = wait(sem); c , c r ∈ L( c 1 , ν 1 ), R 6 ( c 1 , ν 1 ), and typing rules, we have that Γ (sem) = low . By this fact and R 16 (w 1 , w 2 ), By inspecting the semantics, c r ∈ L( c 1 , ν 1 ), and R 6 ( c 1 , ν 1 ), we have that Γ (sem) = low , r ∈ t •1 = t •2 . By these last facts, R 17 (w 1 , ν 1 ), and R 17 (w 2 , ν 2 ), we obtain that R 17 (w 2 , ν 2 ) and R 17 (w 2 , ν 2 ) hold. By inspecting the semantics of threadpools, this event can be produced by two rules in Figure 12 . Which rule is applied depends on the waiting list w(sem) when executing signal, which is captured by the scheduler events u r r and u r a . The proof proceeds similarly in both cases. Therefore, we omit the case when the scheduler triggers the event u r r . By inspecting the semantics for threadpools, the scheduler, and commands, we have that c r ∈ L( c 1 , ν 1 ), and that c r = signal(sem); c for some command c . By inspecting the semantics for threadpools and commands, we have the transition |c r , m 1 | u(sem) |c r , m 1 | , and that |σ 1 , ν 1 | u r a |σ 1 , ν 1 | for some a. Because |σ 1 , ν 1 | ∼ L |σ 2 , ν 2 | and α 1 is low, we also have that |σ 2 , ν 2 | u r a |σ 2 , ν 2 | . In addition to that, we also know that c r ∈ L( c 2 , ν 2 ) since L( c 2 , ν 2 ) = L( c 1 , ν 1 ), and that |c r , m 2 | u(sem) |c r , m 2 | . We can therefore conclude that | c 2 , m 2 , σ 2 , ν 2 , w 2 | u r sem → | c 2 , m 2 , σ 2 , ν 2 , w 2 | . Proposition R 1 (m 1 , m 2 ) holds by applying Lemma 6 to c r . By R 4 ( c 1 , ν 1 , c 2 , ν 2 ) and inspecting the semantics of threadpools and the scheduler, we have that L( c 1 , ν 1 ) = L( c 2 , ν 2 ) = L( c 1 , ν 1 ) ∪ {c a }. Therefore, we have that R 4 ( c 1 , ν 1 , c 2 , ν 2 ) holds. Moreover, R 2 ( c 1 , ν 1 ), R 2 ( c 2 , ν 2 ), R 3 ( c 1 , ν 1 ), and R 3 ( c 2 , ν 2 ) hold since R 2 ( c 1 , ν 1 ), R 2 ( c 2 , ν 2 ), R 3 ( c 1 , ν 1 ), R 3 ( c 2 , ν 2 ), R 11 (w 1 , ν 1 ), R 11 (w 2 , ν 2 ), Γ (sem) = low by typing rules, and R 17 (w 1 , ν 1 ) hold. By taking p = p, we have that R 5 ( c 1 , w 1 , ν 1 , c 2 , w 2 , ν 2 , p) holds since proposition R 5 ( c 1 , w 1 , ν 1 , c 2 , ν 2 , w 2 , p) holds and because the eventually low thread, if exists one, has made no progress. Proposition R 6 ( c 1 , ν 1 ) holds by R 6 ( c 1 , ν 1 ), inspecting the se-mantics of threadpools, and R 13 ( c 1 , ν 1 ). R 7 ( c 1 , ν 1 , c 2 , ν 2 ) holds because R 7 ( c 1 ,w 2 , ν 2 , p) and R 7 ( c 1 , ν 1 , c 2 , ν 2 , p) holds ; and by inspecting the type derivation of c re . R 7 ( c 1 , ν 1 , c 2 , ν 2 ) holds since R 7 ( c 1 , ν 1 , c 2 , ν 2 ) holds and because high threads have been not modified by the transition α 1 . R 8 ( c 1 , ν 1 , c 2 , ν 2 ) holds since EL( c 1 , ν 1 ) = EL( c 2 , ν 2 ) = ∅. Finally, R 9 (σ 1 , ν 1 , σ 2 , ν 2 ) holds since R 9 (σ 1 , ν 1 , σ 2 , ν 2 ) holds and by applying the definition of ∼ L . Propositions R 10−17 hold since they hold already by hypothesis and since transition α 1 does not affect blocked threads.
Corollary 2 (Soundness). If Γ hc , hc → low c : low then c is secure.
Proof. For arbitrary σ, m 1 , and m 2 so that m 1 = L m 2 and σ is noninterferent, assume |c, m 1 , σ, ν init | ⇓ cfg 1 & |c, m 2 , σ, ν init | ⇓ cfg 2 . Observe that, by assuming terminating configurations, it is not possible to apply case ii) of Theorem 2. By inductive (in the number of transition steps of the above configurations) application of Theorem 2, we propagate invariant m 1 = L m 2 to the terminating configurations.
